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Inria Paris, France
Relativistic cryptography exploits the fact that no information can travel faster than the speed
of light in order to obtain security guarantees that cannot be achieved from the laws of quantum
mechanics alone. Recently, Lunghi et al [Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015] presented a bit commitment scheme
where each party uses two agents that exchange classical information in a synchronized fashion, and
that is both hiding and binding. A caveat is that the commitment time is intrinsically limited by
the spatial configuration of the players, and increasing this time requires the agents to exchange
messages during the whole duration of the protocol. While such a solution remains computationally
attractive, its practicality is severely limited in realistic settings since all communication must remain
perfectly synchronized at all times.
In this work, we introduce a robust protocol for relativistic bit commitment that tolerates failures
of the classical communication network. This is done by adding a third agent to both parties. Our
scheme provides a quadratic improvement in terms of expected sustain time compared to the original
protocol, while retaining the same level of security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive between
two players Alice (the committer), and Bob (the receiver)
who do not trust each other. A bit commitment protocol
has two main phases: a commit phase and an open (or
reveal) phase. Alice commits to a bit d during the commit
phase. We say that the protocol is hiding if before the
open phase, Bob has no information about d. During the
open phase, Alice reveals d to Bob, who wants to make
sure that Alice didn’t change her mind about the value
of d, this is the binding property.
It is well-known that bit commitment is impossible in
the standard model [1], even when allowing for quantum
protocols [2, 3]. In that case, it was shown that a pro-
tocol cannot be both hiding and binding. On the other
hand, bit commitment becomes possible in the splitting
agent model, where the two players Alice and Bob have
a coalition of agents at their disposal: A1, . . . ,Am for
Alice, B1, . . . ,Bm for Bob. The basic idea is to dispatch
these agents in m distant locations and restrict the infor-
mation exchange between different locations. This model
has been extensively considered in the classical domain
since the no communication assumption allows to im-
plement many interesting cryptographic primitives: bit
commitment [1], oblivious transfer [4] or protocols for
private information retrieval [5–7].
From a practical point of view, however, the no com-
munication assumption is a bit difficult to justify. A con-
vincing way to enforce it is to rely on the No Superluminal
Signaling (NSS) principle which states that no carrier of
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information can travel faster than the speed of light. In
particular, an event in spacetime cannot be influenced by
events which do not lie in its past causal cone.
The idea of using the NSS principle for cryptographic
protocols originated in a pioneering work by Kent in 1999
[8] as a way to physically enforce the non communication
constraint between the different agents of one party. The
original goal of Kent was to bypass the no-go theorems for
quantum bit-commitment [2, 3]. Interestingly, this origi-
nal protocol was classical and allowed for several rounds
which increased the lifespan of the protocol. However,
the protocol required to exchange messages whose length
scaled exponentially in the number of rounds (i.e. the
commitment time) and a feasible implementation was not
possible for a large number of rounds. A subsequent work
[9] improved this scaling, but to our knowledge, no pre-
cise time/security tradeoff is available for this protocol.
More recently, quantum relativistic bit commitment
protocols were developed where the parties exchange
quantum systems, with the hope that combining the NSS
principle with quantum theory will lead to more secure
(but less practical) protocols [10–12]. In particular, the
protocol [11] was implemented in Ref. [13]. We note that
the scope of relativistic cryptography is not limited to
bit commitment. For instance, there was recently some
interest (sparked again by Kent) for position-verification
protocols [14–16] but contrary to the case of bit com-
mitment, it was shown that secure position-verification
is impossible both in the classical and the quantum set-
tings [17, 18].
The original idea of [1] was recently revisited by Cré-
peau et al. [19] (see also [20]). Based on this work,
Lunghi et al. devised a multi-round bit commitment pro-
tocol involving only four agents, two for Alice and two
for Bob [21]. They managed to prove that this proto-
col, which we call the “FQ protocol” from now on, re-
mains secure for several rounds, against classical attacks.
Unfortunately, this proof was rather inefficient since the
complexity of the protocol (the size of the messages the
agents need to exchange at each round) scaled exponen-
2
tially with the number of rounds. Recently, two papers
improved the security proof and showed that the com-
plexity of the protocol in fact only scales logarithmically
with the number of rounds [22, 23], implying that the
commitment time is essentially unlimited. This much
better scaling shows that the protocol is quite practical,
and a convincing experiment recently demonstrated the
possibility of sustaining a commitment for 24 hours [24],
consisting of 5 × 109 rounds. Although quite impres-
sive, it should be noted that this implementation cru-
cially used a 1 meter dedicated optical link between A1
and B1 (as well as between A2 and B2). In order to im-
plement the protocol in a more realistic fashion, Alice
and Bob’s agents would need to communicate over a real
telecom network, which is prone to rare failures, for in-
stance delays in packet deliveries that would invalidate
the no communication assumption and would cause the
protocol to abort.
An important drawback of the FQ protocol is that it is
not at all robust against losses, or delays. Indeed, for the
bit commitment to succeed, it is crucial that the various
agents communicate with perfect synchronization for all
k rounds of the protocol: if one agent fails to answer one
challenge in time, then the whole protocol aborts. While
this could be fine for small values of k, say k ≤ 10, this is
obviously disastrous for much larger values, for instance
k ranging in the millions or billions as in [24]. For this
reason, it is important to see whether some variant of
the FQ protocol can be made tolerant against (a limited)
amount of losses. In this paper, we investigate one such
variant where the original FQ protocol is modified so that
both parties have now three agents at their disposal in-
stead of two. We present the protocol in Section II. We
prove its security against classical adversaries in Section
III where we show that the security scales similarly as
for the FQ protocol. Finally, in Section IV, we show that
the communication cost of the protocol is comparable to
that of the FQ protocol but that its expected commit-
ment time is quadratically improved.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMITMENT
SCHEMES
A commitment scheme Π = (COMM,OPEN) is the
description of the protocol followed by the honest parties
during both the commit and the open phases. All the
protocols that we consider in this paper will be perfectly
hiding and we will consequently only be interested in the
binding property. Therefore, we only consider the case
of a cheating Alice, which will be described through her
cheating strategy Str∗ = (Comm∗,Open∗) in both phases
of the protocol. The binding property we consider is the
standard sum-property, that was also used in previous
work regarding relativistic bit commitment [21–23].
Definition 1 (Sum-binding). We say that a bit commit-
ment protocol Π is ε-sum-binding if, ∀ Comm∗,
1∑
d=0
max
Open∗
(Pr[Alice successfully reveals d | Str∗])
≤ 1 + ε.
In this section, we describe successively the single-
round protocol (with commitment time bounded by τ =
D/c where D is the distance between the distant loca-
tions and c is the speed of light), the FQ multi-round
protocol and finally our loss-tolerant protocol, the Tree
protocol.
For simplicity of analysis, we consider in this paper
that all computations are performed instantaneously and
that information travels at the speed of light. One could
relax these assumptions by replacing τ by a smaller con-
stant, but this would not change the various scalings of
parameters and we therefore ignore this issue here.
An important consequence of the fact that the proto-
cols are perfectly hiding is that the spatial configuration
of the agents needs only to be checked by Bob: in partic-
ular, it is sufficient for Bob to make sure that his agents
are at a distance at least D from each other. If this is the
case, and if Alice’s agents answer their challenges in time,
then Bob can deduce that her agents are also separated
by a distance D.
A. The single-round protocol
The single-round version of the protocol was intro-
duced by Crépeau et al. [19] (see also [20]). Both players,
Alice and Bob, have agents A1,A2 and B1,B2 present at
two spatial locations, L1 and L2, separated by a distance
D. We consider the case where Alice makes the commit-
ment. The protocol (followed by honest players) consists
of four phases: preparation, commit, sustain and reveal.
The sustain phase in the single-round protocol is triv-
ial and simply consists in waiting for a time less than τ ,
which is the time needed for light to travel between the
two locations.
Overall the bit commitment protocol goes as follows.
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share a
random number a ∈ FQ (resp. b ∈ FQ).
2. Commit phase: B1 sends b to A1, who returns y =
a+d∗b where d ∈ F2 is the committed bit. Here and
everywhere in this paper, all operations like + and
∗ are understood as addition and multiplications in
FQ.
3. Sustain phase: A1 and A2 wait for some time less
than τ .
4. Reveal phase: A2 reveals the values of d and a to
B2 who checks that y = a+ d ∗ b.
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B. The FQ-protocol (multi-round, not loss-tolerant)
The single-round protocol above was recently extended
to a multi-round commitment scheme [21]. The main
idea to increase the commitment time is to delay the
reveal phase and have A2 commit to the string a instead
of revealing it. In fact, the new sustain phase will now
consist of many rounds where the active agents (i.e. the
agent of Alice who commits in that given round and the
corresponding agent for Bob) alternate between locations
L1 and L2. Overall the k-round bit commitment protocol
goes as follows (for k even):
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share k
random numbers a1, . . . , ak (resp. b1, . . . , bk) ∈ FQ.
2. Commit phase (round 1): B1 sends b1 to A1, who
returns y1 = a1 + d ∗ b1 where d ∈ F2 is the com-
mitted bit.
3. Sustain phase: at round j ≤ k, active Bob sends
bj ∈ FQ to active Alice, who returns yj = aj + bj ∗
aj−1.
4. Reveal phase: A1 reveals d and ak to B1. B1 com-
putes recursively α0 = d and αi+1 = yi+1−bi+1∗αi
and checks that αk = ak. If this is the case, Alice
has successfully revealed the bit d.
The main idea of the multi-round protocol is to de-
lay the reveal phase in order to increase the commitment
time. This delay is obtained by making the passive Alice
commit to the value of the string she was supposed to re-
veal in the previous round. Since each round increases the
total commitment time by a quantity equal to τ (modulo
the time needed for the various algebraic manipulations
in FQ that we ignore), one sees that the required number
of rounds scales linearly with the commitment time one
wishes to achieve.
We require that round j finishes before any information
about bj−1 reaches the other Alice. For any j, this im-
plies that Alice’s active agent has no information about
bj−1. In particular, this means that yj is independent of
bj−1. This will be crucial in order to show security of the
protocol.
C. The Tree protocol (multi-round and
loss-tolerant)
In order to formulate a loss-tolerant variant of the FQ-
protocol, we require that each party has 3 agents located
at three locations L1, L2, L3 which are at least at a dis-
tance D from each other. As in the FQ multi-round
protocol, timing constraints are represented by rounds.
In the original protocol, at each round, a pair of agents
(Ai,Bi) performs a communication round, consisting of
a challenge bi from Bob’s agent to Alice’s agent and an
answer yi from Alice’s agent to Bob’s.
Our k-round Tree protocol is represented by the com-
plete binary tree of depth k with 2k+1−1 nodes (recalling
that the tree with a single node has depth 0 by conven-
tion). The depth of a node v is equal to the length |v| of
the string v. A node of the tree is a string v of j ≤ k let-
ters in the alphabet {`, r}, corresponding to left or right
child. Let us denote by V the set of all nodes of the tree,
so that |V | = 2k+1 − 1 and by V ∗ the set of all internal
nodes of the tree, that is nodes that are not leaves. Let us
further denote nk = |V ∗| = 2k − 1 the cardinality of V ∗.
The root of the tree is the empty string ∅. A given node v
of depth j < k has two children, a left child v` and a right
child vr. A node v of depth j ≥ 1 has a unique parent
v(parent) and a unique brother v(brother): indeed, if v
is of the form wt with t ∈ {`, r}, then v(parent) = w and
v(brother) = wt̄ where t̄ is the element of {`, r} distinct
from t.
To describe the Tree protocol, we need a 3-coloring c
of this complete binary tree of depth k. The coloring c is
a function
c :
{
V → {1, 2, 3}
v 7→ c(v)
where V is the set of all 2k+1 − 1 nodes in the tree, with
the coloring property that for all v of depth j < k, it
holds that
{c(v), c(v`), c(vr)} = {1, 2, 3}.
The above constraints on the colors means that for any
node v, the colors c(v), c(v`) and c(vr) are all different.
In particular, two brothers have different color(see Fig.
1). This coloring will be used to assign a location L1, L2
or L3 to each node of the tree. In other words, each node
of the tree corresponds to a communication round taking
place at the location Lc(v) corresponding to the color c(v)
of the node v.
More precisely, each node v of depth j of the tree cor-
responds to a communication round with a challenge bv
and an answer yv between agentsAc(v) and Bc(v) at round
j + 1. For a fixed depth, several nodes can have the
same color col, the corresponding agents Acol and Bcol
will then perform all those communication rounds at this
time j + 1. The leaves of the protocol correspond to the
revealing phase.
The new notion that appears in the context of loss-
tolerant protocols is that of a dead or alive node: we
will say that a node v fails (or is dead, or non respon-
sive) if the corresponding agent Ac(v) fails to answer the
challenge sent to her by Bc(v) within time τ at round
j = |v| − 1. Alternatively, an agent is alive (or respon-
sive) if she succeeds in replying in time to the challenge.
In order to account for this extra piece of information,
we will denote by ⊥ Alice’s answer in case her agent is
non responsive for a given node. Said otherwise, while
Bob challenges will still be elements of FQ, the answers
of Alice’s agents are elements of FQ ∪ {⊥}.
This failure can result from a global failure of the net-
work for one agent i for some rounds, in which case for
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all nodes v of the corresponding depth with c(v) = i, we
will have bv =⊥. It may also happen that agent Ai may
answer some queries in time but not some others, which
will result in the corresponding nodes being alive or dead.
Of course, a cheating Alice will try to exploit such fail-
ures to increase to probability to successfully reveal the
bit d of her choice.
Overall the k-round Tree bit commitment protocol
goes as follows (for k ≥ 2):
1. Preparation phase: Agents Ai and Bi are located
at Li for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, A1,A2,A3
(resp. B1,B2,B3) share nk = 2k − 1 random num-
bers (av)v∈V ∗ ∈ FnkQ (resp. (bv)v∈V ∗ ∈ F
nk
Q ). This
means that the agents share random numbers for all
the internal nodes of the tree (not for the leaves).
Alice’s agents also share d ∈ {0, 1} which is the
committed bit.
2. Commit phase (round 1): Bc(∅) sends b∅ to Ac(∅),
who returns y∅ = a∅ +d ∗ b∅. If Bob’s agent Bc(∅)
does not receive Alice’s response before time τ , then
the protocol aborts.
3. Sustain phase (rounds 2 to k): at round j + 1 ≤ k,
for each node vt of depth j+ 1 (i.e. |v| = j and t ∈
{`, r}), agent Bc(vt) sends bvt ∈ FQ to Ac(vt) who
returns yvt = avt+bvt∗av. If Bc(vt) does not receive
Alice’s response within time τ , the corresponding
value of yvt is set to the value corresponding to
a dead node, that is yvt =⊥. When this is the
case, the branch is considered to be dead, and Bob’s
agents stop sending challenges for that particular
branch as soon as they know it is dead.
4. Reveal phase: For each node v = wt of depth k
(i.e. with |w| = k − 1 and t ∈ {`, r}), Agent Ac(v)
reveals d and aw to Bc(v). Bob’s agents check (i)
that for each depth j < k, the leftmost alive node
of the tree has at least one child alive and if it’s the
case, then (ii) that for the leftmost alive path (v0 =
∅, v1, . . . , vk = v) in the tree, Bob’s agents compute
recursively the values α∅ = y∅ − b∅ ∗ d, αvi =
yvi − bvi ∗ αvi−1 and check that αvk = avk . If both
conditions are satisfied, then Alice has successfully
revealed the bit d.
Remark: Since only the values of the leftmost alive
branch matter for the verification step, it is useless in
practice to keep other branches alive. A simple modifi-
cation of the above protocol consists for Bob’s agents to
keep track of the leftmost alive branch and stop sending
challenges for all other branches. We will analyze this
in further detail in Section IV where we investigate the
communication cost of the Tree protocol.
III. SECURITY OF THE TREE PROTOCOL
The three protocols described above all share the prop-
erty that they are perfectly hiding. Indeed, the role of
  
yv=av+bv av ( parent )
bv
yvl=avl+bvl av
bvl bvr
yvr=avr+bvr avv
vl vr
A1 B1
A2 B2 A3 B3
Figure 1: Pictorial view for an internal node of the Tree proto-
col. Here the coloring is such that c(v) = 1, c(v`) = 2, c(vr) =
3.
the variables a’s shared by Alice’s agents is to hide the
value of d. If all the a’s are chosen uniformly at random
in FQ which is the case if Alice follows honestly the pro-
tocol, then they provide a one-time pad of the secret and
Bob’s agents cannot obtain any information about the
value of d before the reveal phase.
For this reason, our goal is to study whether these
protocols are binding. In particular, this means that we
will only be interested in the case where Bob is honest
and follows the protocol, and Alice’s agents might deviate
from the protocol in order to reveal a bit that is not
necessarily the one they had in mind during the commit
phase. In this paper, we assume that Alice is classical,
i.e., that her agents only share classical variables and not
an entangled quantum state for instance. The question
of proving security against a quantum adversary is left
for future research.
Since Bob is assumed to be honest in the analysis, it
means that his agents are correctly located at stations
L1, L2 and L3. In particular, there is no need for them
to check where Alice’s agents are located: it is sufficient
to know that they responded in time to guarantee that
for each round, each of them has to answer their own
challenge without having access to the challenges sent to
the other agents at the same round.
In all that follows, we consider without loss of gener-
ality a deterministic strategy for Alice for the k-round
Tree protocol, in which any alive node has at least a live
child. Indeed, any probabilisitic cheating strategy can
be expressed as a convex sum of deterministic ones, and
the optimal strategy is the best one among these deter-
ministic strategies. Moreover, it is useful to understand
what an optimal strategy for Alice looks like. Since only
the leftmost alive branch matters in the reveal phase,
at each round, Alice should make sure that the leftmost
alive node has a live child, but she has some freedom to
decide which one. It is easy to see that the best strategy
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is to always keep the right child responsive and to decide
whether the keep the left one alive or not based on the
value of the challenge it receives. In other words, at each
round, the left child of the leftmost alive child will decide
either to answer its challenge (in which case, it will be
the leftmost alive node at the next round), or to refuse
to answer the challenge (in which case, its brother will
become the leftmost alive node at the next round).
A. Sketch
Our goal is to prove the security against a cheating Al-
ice, on average over all of Bob’s random strings b, which
are drawn from the uniform distribution since Bob is hon-
est. Depending on Alice’s strategy and on those strings,
the players will follow different leftmost paths in the tree.
The idea of the proof will be to use a recursive argument,
similarly as in [22]. Informally, the proof will proceed as
follows:
For each node v, we will keep track of a quantity IP (v)
(the Independence Parameter) that will quantify how in-
dependent yv is from bv(parent). For a fixed node v of
depth j ≤ k − 2, we will relate IP (v) with IP (v`) and
IP (vr). Then, if we define IPj to be the average inde-
pendence parameter for nodes of depth j, we will use the
previous relation to show that IPj+1 ≤ IPj + 54ε where
ε = O(1/
√
Q) is a security parameter. Finally, a bound
on IP0 can be readily derived from known bounds on the
classical value of CHSH-like games.
Finally, in order to conclude, we will show that
IPk−1 corresponds exactly to Alice’s cheating probabil-
ity. Putting this together with the fact that IP0 ≤ 12 + ε,
we will obtain the desired result.
In the above sketch, we omitted many discussions
about the dependencies of the above quantities. In this
section, we make the above argument formal, but defer
several proofs to the Appendix. We will organize this
section as follows.
In Subsection III B below, we formally define several
notions of history and of independence parameters that
will be useful for our proofs. In Subsection III C, we re-
late the independence parameter IPk−1 at the last round
to the binding property of the protocol. Finally, in Sec-
tion IIID, we prove our recursive argument, and therefore
prove the security of our protocol. The more technical
details of the proof are deferred to the appendix.
B. Notations & Definitions
For any j ≤ k, let V≤j be the set of nodes of depth at
most j and V=j the set of nodes of depth j.
Definition 2. For any integer j ∈ [k], for any set S ⊆
V≤j, let HSj be the set of possible histories of S, i.e. the
set of possible commitment values d ∈ {0, 1} and strings
bv ∈ FQ for every v ∈ S. Since each bv is an element of
FQ for v ∈ S, we will identify an element of HSj as an
element of {0, 1} × F|S|Q .
Let us note that in practice, Bob’s agents stop sending
challenges to nodes they know to be in a “dead” branch,
which means that the corresponding bv’s do not formally
belong to FQ. For the security analysis, however, this
is irrelevant since these nodes have no impact on the re-
vealing phase of the bit commitment, which means that
we can assume that these bv’s are elements of FQ, so that
the set of histories introduced above is well defined.
We also define Hj := H
V≤j
j and H
−S
j := H
(V≤j−S)
j ,
which correspond respectively to the full history of nodes
of depth at most j, and to the full history of such nodes,
except for those in the set S. Moreover, we define
HS−Commj := H
S
j \{0, 1} as the set HSj where we remove
the set of the committed bit. This is convenient when we
need to talk about the history of the variables bv’s only.
In particular, we have Hj = HSj × H
−S−Comm
j . The
set of all possible histories of the tree is Hk−1 := HV
∗
k−1,
since the leaf nodes only consist of Alice revealing (Bob’s
agents do not send any challenge for those nodes).
Since we assume without loss of generality that Alice
follows a deterministic strategy, a history h ∈ Hk−1 in-
duces Alice’s answers {yv}v∈V ∗ and therefore, if we run
Alice’s strategy on some history h, the state of all nodes,
alive or dead, is fixed. Similarly, if we consider h ∈ Hj ,
this induces Alice’s answers {yv}v∈V≤j and therefore, all
nodes of depth at most j are known to be either alive or
dead.
Definition 3. Let v ∈ V≤j and h ∈ Hj be a node and
a history. We say that h is consistent with v if when
running Alice’s strategy on h, the node v is the leftmost
alive one at depth depth(v). We denote by Hj(v) ⊆ Hj
the set of histories consistent with v.
Notice that we have⋃
v∈V=j
Hj(v) = Hj and ∀v, v′ 6= v ∈ V=j ,
Hj(v) ∩Hj(v′) = ∅,
which simply states that each history up to depth j is
consistent with exactly one node of V=j .
Definition 4. For v ∈ V≤j, S ⊆ V≤j and h1 ∈ HSj ,
we say that h1 is consistent with v if there exists h2 ∈
H−S−Commj such that (h1, h2) ∈ Hj(v). We denote by
HSj (v) ⊆ HSj the set of h1 ∈ S consistent with v.
By construction of the protocol, if Alice successfully
reveals a value at the end, it means that for all rounds,
the leftmost alive node has an alive child. In particular,
this implies that the prefix of the leftmost alive branch
doesn’t change during the execution of the protocol: if v
be the leftmost alive node at depth depth(v) for a given
HSdepth(v)(v), then it remains the leftmost alive node at
depth depth(v) for any future history HSj (v) with j >
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depth(v). We therefore have that for any non root node
v ∈ V≤j and set S ⊆ V≤j , HSj (v) ⊆ HSj (w) where w is
the parent of v.
Definition 5. For a fixed vertex v ∈ V≤j, a set S ⊆
(V≤j −{v}) and a history h ∈ HSj (v), let Bhj (v) := {bv ∈
FQ : (h, bv) ∈ HS∪{v}j (v)} be the set of values for bv
for which node v answers in time. Equivalently, FQ −
Bhj (v) is the set of questions for which node v will be non
responsive, according to Alice’s strategy and the history
h.
Note that if v = wl is the left child of the leftmost
alive node at depth depth(v)−1, then Bhj (v) is the set of
values in FQ for which v chooses to respond in time for
Alice’s strategy. On the other hand, if bv 6∈ Bhj (v), then
the node chooses to be non responsive, and the leftmost
alive node at that round becomes the right brother of v.
Notice that Bhj (v) is independent of bw.
Definition 6. For j ≤ k, we define the random vari-
able Zj which takes value v ∈ V=j with probability Hj(v)Hj .
This random variable corresponds to the node that is the
leftmost alive node at depth j.
For each node v, let us recall that Ac(v) (resp. Bc(v))
refers to Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) agent at that node.
Definition 7. For any node v ∈ V=j, let Acc(v) ⊆ V≤j
be the set of nodes containing history information acces-
sible to Ac(v), including the value of the commitment.
Crucially, the relativistic constraints impose that
v(parent), v(brother) /∈ Acc(v).
Let us consider a vertex vj of depth j and a history h
consistent with vj . The leftmost alive path up to depth
j has the form (v0 = ∅, v1, . . . , vj). Recall that the vari-
ables αvi are recursively defined for i ≤ j by
αvi :=
{
yv0 − bv0 ∗ d if i = 0,
yvi − bvi ∗ αvi(parent) otherwise.
(1)
Recall also that αvj and yvj are functions of the history
Hj since Alice’s strategy is deterministic.
Similarly as in [22], we introduce a quantity IP which
is the independence parameter between a variable and a
function (or a family of functions). Intuitively, this quan-
tity is large if the function is independent of the variable
and close to 0 otherwise. In particular, it quantifies how
well the function can be approximated by another func-
tion that does not depend on the given variable. This is
relevant here since in a cheating strategy, Alice’s agent
tries to answer to Bob’s challenge without knowing the
value of the challenge sent to her parent, and she wins
if she manages to give an answer that depends on that
specific challenge.
Definition 8. For any integer j ≤ k − 1, any family of
functions {gv : HAcc(v)j (v)→ FQ}v∈V=j , we define
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ) :=
Ev←ZjEh←H−{v}j (v)Ebv←Bhj (v)[gv(d, h) == αv(d, h, bv)],
where gv(d, h) == αv(d, h,bv) represents the variable that
equals 1 if the equality [gv(d, h) = αv(d, h, bv)] holds and
0 otherwise. Moreover, the notation Ev←Zj corresponds
to the expectation over the possible values v of the random
variable Zj, and similarly for the other expectations.
Intuitively, this quantity is simply the expectation that
Alice’s agent (at round j + 1) gives an answer consistent
with the value (αv) expected by Bob’s agent, for the left-
most alive node, when averaging over all possible histo-
ries: the restriction on Alice’s strategy is that her agent
at round j + 1 does not know the value of bv at round
j. Note here that in the above definition, the function
g takes as inputs elements more history elements than
those in HAcc(v)j (v). The function g will simply disre-
gard those inputs. We added them for notational sim-
plicity but we will use later the fact that the outcome
gv(d, h) actually depends only on the history elements of
H
Acc(v)
j (v).
We are finally in position to define the IP parameter
at depth j.
Definition 9. For j ≤ k− 1, the IP parameter at depth
j is
IPj := max
{gv}v∈V=j
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ). (2)
In the next subsection, we provide some motivation
for this definition by showing that IPk−1 corresponds
to Alice’s cheating probability. This can be understood
intuitively because IPk−1 quantifies how well the agents
of Alice at the kth round (i.e. those you reveal the bit
value) can give an answer consistent with Alice’s agent’s
answer at the previous round.
C. Final Condition
Proposition 1. The IP parameter satisfies the following
bound:
1 + εk ≤ 2IPk−1
where εk is the binding security parameter of the k-round
protocol.
Proof. Let P ∗A be Alice’s cheating probability. Let P
∗
A|v
be Alice’s cheating probability when the leftmost alive
node at depth k − 1 is v. We have by definition P ∗A =
Ev←Zk−1 [P ∗A|v]. Let leaf(v) be the associated leaf that
will be used for the reveal phase: leaf(v) = v` if v`
is alive, otherwise leaf(v) = vr. Let (aleaf(v), d) be Al-
ice’s output for that leaf. Recall that Bob then checks
whether αv = aleaf(v) where αv is computed recursively
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as in Eq. 1. Bob’s checking procedure implies that
P ∗A|v = Eh←H−{v}j (v)Ebv←Bhj (v)[aleaf(v)(h) == αv(h, bv)]
≤ E
h←H−{v}j (v)
[
max
gv:H
Acc(v)
j (v)→FQ
{Ebv←Bhj (v)[gv(h) == αv(h, bv)]}]
=: IPk−1(v)
where we averaged over all histories giving v as the left-
most node of depth k − 1. From there, we have
P ∗A = Ev←Zk−1 [P ∗A|v] ≤ Ev←Zk−1 [IPk−1(v)] = IPk−1
By definition of the binding property, it holds that P ∗A =
1
2 (1 + εk), which yields the desired result.
Proposition 1 shows that it is sufficient to prove a good
upper bound on IPk−1 in order to show that the bit-
commitment protocol is binding.
D. Bounding the value of IPk−1
Our goal is now to bound the value of IPk−1. For this,
we will use a recursive argument to bound IPj for all
j ≤ k− 1. Before that, we start by finding an expression
for IPj that is suitable for a recursive analysis. Consider
a node v of depth j ≤ k − 2. For a fixed history h0 ∈
H
−{v,v`,vr}
j+1 (v), two nodes v and vt (with t ∈ {`, r}), we
define the quantity IPh0vt :
IPh0vt := max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(bv) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)],
(3)
where vt is a child of node v. We show the following:
Proposition 2. For all j ≤ k − 2, it holds that:
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ],
where T (v|h0) is the function that outputs t ∈ {`, r} if
the leftmost alive child of v is vt.
The proof of this proposition is based on elementary
manipulations of the expected values and is presented in
detail in Appendix A.
We can now proceed to bounding IPj . We first con-
sider the base case where j = 0.
Lemma 1.
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
.
Proof. This property was already proven in [22]. For
completeness, we reproduce this proof using the nota-
tions of the present paper in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. For every node v ∈ V=j, t ∈ {`, r} and his-
tory h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v) it holds that:
IPh0vt ≤ IPh0v +
√
2
|Bh0j+1(vt)|
.
where we slightly abuse notation by defining IPh0v :=
maxg Ebv←Bh0j [g = αv(h0, bv)].
The reason we say we slightly abuse notation is the
discrepancy on what is fixed between this definition and
the one in Equation 3. Notice that we have
IPj = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 [IP
h0
v ].
Proof. We prove here Lemma 2. As in [22], we use the
Alice’s cheating strategy to come up with a strategy for
a variant of the CHSH game with inputs and outputs in
FQ instead of F2. Then upper bounds on the classical
value of this CHSH variant allow us to bound the value
of IP .
The class of CHSHQ(p) games was introduced in [22] in
order to analyze the security of the FQ protocols. These
are simply two-party nonlocal games between Adeline
and Bastian who respectively receive inputs x, y ∈ FQ
and output a, b ∈ FQ. Here x is drawn from the uniform
distribution while y is drawn according to a probability
distribution {py}y∈FQ such that maxy py ≤ p. Adeline
and Bastian win the game if a+ b = x ∗ y in FQ. Let us
define a slight variant of these games where the only dif-
ference is now that Adeline’s inputs are drawn uniformly
from a subset S of FQ. We denote this class of games by
CHSHSQ(p).
We start with Equation 3:
IPh0vt = max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(bv) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)].
We write αvt(h, bv, bvt) = yvt(h, bvt) + bvt ∗ αv(h, bv).
From there, we can see that the dependence in bv of the
function αvt(h, bv, bvt) lies only in the function αv(h, bv).
Therefore, we can write
IPh0vt = max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(αv(h0, bv)) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)].
(4)
Let Gh0 be the function g that maximizes the above
expression. In order to end the proof, we perform the
following steps: (1) we define an entangled game that
will be an instance of some CHSHSQ game for some
S, (2) we construct a cheating strategy for this game
using the functions yvt and Gh
0
and finally (3) we use
the known bounds on CHSHSQ to derive a bound on IP
h0
vt .
We consider the following game between two players
Adeline and Bastian:
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• Adeline receives a random element X ∈ Bh0j+1(vt).
Bastian receives an element Y ∈ FQ such that
Pr[Y = c] = Prbv [αv(h, bv) = c].
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in Fq
such that A+B = X ∗ Y
Recall that IPh0v = maxc Prbv←Bh0j (v)[αv(h, bv) = c].
Since Adeline has no information about bv, her proba-
bility of guessing Y is upper bounded by IPh0v . This
means that the two player game we study is an instance
of CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v ). We know from Lemma 6 (proven
in Appendix C) the following upper bound on the classi-
cal value of such a game:
ω
(
CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v )
)
≤ IPh0v +
√
2
|Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)|
.
We now use Alice’s cheating strategy to derive a strategy
for the above game. Adeline outputs A = yvt(h0, X) and
Bastian outputs B = −Gh0(Y ). We can lower bound the
value of the game as follows:
ω(CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v ))
≥ Pr
X,Y
[A+B = X ∗ Y ]
≥ Pr
X,Y
[yvt(h0, X)− Gh0(Y ) = X ∗ Y ]
= Pr
X,bv
[yvt(h0, X)− Gh0(αv(h0, bv)) = X ∗ αv(h0, bv)]
= Pr
X,bv
[αvt(h, bv, X) + (αv(h0, bv) ∗X)
− Gh0(αv(h0, bv)) = (X ∗ αv(h0, bv))]
= Pr
X,bj
[αvt(h, bv, X) = Gh0(αv(h0, bv))]
= IPh0vt .
Combining the upper and the lower bound on
ω(CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v )), we conclude that
IPh0vt ≤ IPh0v +
√
2
|Bh0j+1(vt)|
.
We are now ready to prove the recurrence relation.
Proposition 3. For j ≤ k − 2, it holds that:
IPj+1 ≤ IPj +
5
4
√
2
Q
.
Proof. For v ∈ Zj , h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 , the probability that
Alice is responsive at node v`, or equivalently, that v` is
the leftmost alive node at round j + 1, is Pr[T (v|h0) =
`] =
|Bh0j+1(v`)|
Q =: Ph0 . Proposition 2 gives:
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ]
= Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)[Ph0IP
h0
v` + (1− Ph0)IP
h0
vr ]
We use Lemma 2 in order to bound IPh0vl and IP
h0
vr . We
have by definition |Bh0j+1(vl)| = Ph0Q and |B
h0
j+1(vr)| =
Q. From there, we have
IPj+1
= Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)[
Ph0
(
IPh0v +
√
2
Ph0Q
)
+ (1− Ph0)
(
IPh0v +
√
2
Q
)]
(5)
= Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)[
IPh0v + (1 +
√
Ph0 − Ph0)
√
2
Q
]
≤ Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[
IPh0v +
5
4
√
2
Q
]
(6)
= IPj +
5
4
√
2
Q
where we used the bound (1 +
√
P − P ) ≤ 54 for P ≥ 0
in Eq. 6.
Combining Propositions 1, 3 and Lemma 1 gives our
main result.
Corollary 1. The k-round Tree protocol is εk-sum-
binding with
εk ≤
5k√
2Q
.
This scaling is very close to the one of the FQ protocol
for which the binding parameter is upper bounded by
2
√
2k/
√
Q according to Ref. [22].
IV. LOSS TOLERANCE AND
COMMUNICATION COST OF THE TREE
PROTOCOL
A. Lifetime of the Tree protocol
The main point of considering the Tree protocol in-
stead of the simpler FQ-protocol is that it displays some
loss tolerance. In this section, we consider a very simple
model of loss and evaluate the performance of the Tree
protocol compared to the FQ-protocol.
For this, we assume that in the honest case, each sta-
tion (corresponding to a couple Ai,Bi) dies with some
probability p at each round of the protocol. This process
is taken to be independent and identical. Moreover, we
consider the scenario where a dead station remain dead
for a time mτ , where m is some small integer such that
m  k and mp  1. This loss model could of course
be refined, for instance by adding correlations between
the various probabilities of dying for modeling a global
network failure for example, or by taking the dead time
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to be a random variable as well, but our simplified model
allows for a more straightforward comparison of the dif-
ferent protocols and arguably already captures the be-
havior of realistic failures due to loss in bit commitment
protocols.
Observation 1. In the honest scenario where all players
follow the protocol but losses are allowed, the Tree proto-
col protocol aborts if and only if two stations are dead at
the same time (except at the first round).
Proposition 4. Provided that mp 1 and m k, the
probabilities that the k-round FQ and Tree protocols don’t
abort are given by
Pok(FQ) = (1− p)k (7)
Pok(Tree) = (1− q)k (8)
with q = 3(mp)2 + (mp)3.
Proof. Let us first consider the FQ protocol: it aborts as
soon as one station dies. At each round, a honest Alice
responds in time with probability 1−p. Since these events
are assumed to be independent, the probability that Alice
responds in time for the full protocol, that is, all k rounds,
is Pok(FQ) = (1− p)k.
In the Tree protocol, each station is non-responsive at
a given round i ≥ m with probability mp if we assume
that mp 1: this is the probability that the station died
during any of the m previous rounds. The probability
that at least two stations are alive at a given round is
equal to the probability that at most one of the three
stations is non-responsive, that is (mp)3 + 3(mp)2 = q.
It follows that the probability that the Tree protocol does
not abort is (1− q)k, in the regime where m is negligible
compared to the number of rounds.
Let us define the lifetime tΠ(p) of a protocol Π as the
number of rounds required to achieve Pok(Π) ≈ 1/e if
each station dies independently with probability p. Then,
Proposition 4 states that
tFQ(p) =
1
mp
and tTree(p) =
1
q
≈ 1
3m2p2
(9)
provided that mp  1. In particular, adding a third
player to the standard FQ-protocol provides a quadratic
improvement in the expected lifetime of the commitment
time.
B. Communication cost of the Protocol
Trimming the tree. One drawback of the tree protocol
is that size of the tree grows exponentially with number
of rounds, causing a huge overhead in both computation
and communication cost. If up to the j − 1-th round all
nodes of the tree are alive then the j-th round would con-
sist in executing 2j rounds of the FQ protocol in parallel,
which is clearly unpractical for large values of j. To keep
this complexity under control, one can note that only
the leftmost alive path matters for the protocol: none
of the other branches will ever be considered in the re-
veal phase, and it is therefore useless to maintain them
during the whole protocol. For this reason, it is natural
to modify the tree protocol as follows: after each round,
each one of Bob’s agents sends a classical message to his
two colleagues in order to inform them on which branches
were alive or dead. If the maximum distance between two
agents of Bob is Dmax, then they all learn which branches
were alive up to round j after a time Dmax/c. In other
words, it takes them the equivalent of N := Dmax/(cτ)
rounds to learn this information, and therefore to learn
which was the leftmost alive path until round j. Once
they share this information, they can stop applying the
FQ protocol on other branches of the tree.
The modification suggested above implies that at each
instant, the actual size of the maintained tree is O(2N ),
which remains practical provided that the distance be-
tween Bob’s agents is not considerably larger than cτ .
One should also emphasize that this trimming of the
tree has no consequence on the security of the protocol,
since it simply consists in aborting classical communica-
tion that will not intervene at all in the protocol.
Let us now evaluate the communication cost of the
various protocols, that is the number of bits that are ex-
changed among various agents during the whole protocol.
Note first that by construction, all the challenges and re-
sponses are elements of FQ, meaning that each round
(corresponding to each alive node in the Tree protocol)
has an individual cost of 2 log2Q bits.
Proposition 5. The communication cost CFQ and CTree
of the k-round FQ and Tree protocols are given by:
CFQ = 2k log2Q (10)
CTree ≈ k2N+2 log2Q, (11)
where N is the number of rounds necessary for all agents
to realize that a given branch is dead. Recall that taking
log2Q = O(log(k/ε)) is sufficient to guarantee that the
protocol is ε-binding.
In practice, the value of N will be a small constant,
which shows that the communication cost of the Tree
protocol compares favorably with that of the original k-
round FQ protocol.
Proof. Obtaining the communication cost of the FQ pro-
tocol is straightforward: there are k rounds that each
cost 2 log2Q bits.
For the Tree protocol, we consider the “worst case sce-
nario” where Alice’s agents always respond in time. This
means that all branches are alive unless Bob’s agents de-
cide not to send them challenges anymore. Since only the
leftmost alive branch matters in the reveal phase, and
since the prefix of the leftmost alive node never changes
during the protocol, it is easy to see that Bob’s agents do
not need to continue sending challenges to branches that
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they know not to be the leftmost alive branch. In gen-
eral, it may take N additional rounds before all agents
learn the status of all the history up to a given round.
This means that in the worst case, Bob’s agents should
send challenges to all the descendants of the current left-
most alive node for N rounds. The number of such nodes
is upper bounded by 2N+1. Since there are k rounds in
total, the communication cost of the Tree protocol Tree
can be upper bounded by 2N+1k × 2 log2Q bits.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a new relativistic bit com-
mitment protocol that addresses one of the main weak-
nesses of the FQ protocol, namely its fragility against
network failures. Indeed, the FQ protocol aborts as soon
as one agent fails to respond to a single challenge in time.
We fix this issue by modifying the FQ protocol so that
each party is now represented by 3 agents in 3 distinct
locations. The communication cost of this variant is rel-
atively modest, but the gain in terms of tolerance to loss
is very good: one expects a quadratic gain for the num-
ber of rounds that the protocol can sustain, making it
very promising for implementations in real telecom net-
works (instead of dedicated networks), which is crucial
for a possible future deployment of this technology.
We conclude with a couple of open problems that are
left for future investigation. First, the tree structure that
we rely on here does not seem to be optimal and simpler
schemes with reduced communication complexity would
be interesting. Second, our security analysis is restricted
to classical adversaries, as was already the case in [22, 23]
and the obvious next step is to see whether one can also
prove security against quantum adversaries. The main
difficulty to extend the analysis to the quantum case is
that the composition of the rounds is more complicated
to handle because the history is not described by clas-
sical random variables anymore, but rather by quantum
states.
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This appendix contains the proofs of the main technical
claims as well as a short description of the generalization
of the Tree protocol to an arbitrary number of agents per
party.
Appendix A: Proof of Sum inversions
In this section, we prove Proposition 2 which we recall
below.
Proposition 2. For j ≤ k − 2,
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ].
Proof. Fix an integer j, a node v ∈ V=j and a history
h1 ∈ H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v). Let us define T (v|h1), the random
variable equal to ‘`’ with probability
|Bh1j+1(v`)|
Q and ‘r’
with probability 1 − |B
h1
j+1(v`)|
Q . If h1 is consistent with
v, then vt with t = T (v|h1) is the leftmost alive node at
depth j + 1. Let us also define
Ch1t (v`) =
{
Bh1j+1(v`) if t = `
FQ −Bh1j+1(v`) if t = r
to be the set of possible values of bv` conditioned on the
node v` being responsive (C`) or not (Cr).
By averaging over histories h1 consistent with the
node v, we define the random variable T (v) equal to
‘`’ with probability |Hj+1(v`)||Hj+1(v)| and to ‘r’ with probabil-
ity |Hj+1(vr)||Hj+1(v)| = 1−
|Hj+1(v`)|
|Hj+1(v)| :
T (v) := E
h1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[T (v|h1)]. (A1)
Lemma 3.
IPj+1({gv′}v′∈V=j+1)
= Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h1)
E
bv`←C
h1
t (v`)
Ebvr←FQ [gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
Proof. According to the definition of IPj+1 we have,
IPj+1({gv′}v′∈V=j+1)
= Ev′←Zj+1Eh←H−{v′}j+1 (v′)
Ebv′←Bhj+1(v′)
[gv′(d, h) == αv′(d, h, bv′)]
= Ev←ZjEt←T (v)Eh←H−{vt}j+1 (vt)
Ebvt←Bhj+1(vt)[gvt(d, h) == αvt(d, h, bvt)]
The statement of the lemma follows from the fact that
avt does not depend on bvt.
Lemma 4.
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0)
max
gvt
E
bv∈B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt∈B
(h0,bv)
j+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)].
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have
IPj+1({gv′}) =
Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h1)Ebv`←Ch1t (v`)Ebvr←FQ
[gvt(d, h1, bvt) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
(A2)
From the definition of IPj we have,
IPj+1 = max
gvt∈V=j+1
IPj+1({gv′}) (A3)
Since avt(d, h1, bvt) doesn’t depend on bvt, the value of
IPj+1 remains unchanged if gvt depends only on h1. This
implies that we can write IPj+1 as follows,
IPj+1 = max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h1)
E
bvt←B
h1
j+1(vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
= max
gvt
Ev←ZjE(h0,bv)←(H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)×Bh0j )
Et←T (v|h0,bv)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
where h1 = (h0, bv)
IPj+1 = max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Ebv∈Bh0j
Et←T (v|h0,bv)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
= max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Ebv∈Bh0j
Et←T (v|h0)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)]
Notice that once we fix a leftmost alive node, the decision
to go left or right is independent of bv. Therefore, we have
T (v|h0) = T (v|h0, bv), for any bv ∈ Bh0j (v).
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0) maxgvt
E
bv∈B
h0
j
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)].
For a fixed history h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v) and d, we define
the quantity IPh0vt in following manner,
IPh0,dvt := max
gh0
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)].
(A4)
Substituting the expression of IPh0,dvt in the expression
of IPj+1 we get,
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0,d
vt ].
(A5)
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Appendix B: Base case of the recursion: j = 0
We first consider the base case where j = 0.
Lemma 5.
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
.
Proof. According to the definition of IPj we have,
IPj = max
{gv}v∈V=j
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ), (B1)
where,
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ) = Ev←ZjEh←H−{v}j (v)Ebv←Bhj (v)
[gv(d, h) == αj(d, h, bv)].
(B2)
For j = 0, i.e., at the root of the tree, we have
V=j = {v0}, where v0 = ∅, H−{v0}0 (v0) contains only
the commitment d and Bhj (v) = FQ. So, we have
IP0 = maxgv0 Ed←{0,1}Ebv0←FQ [gv0(d) == αv0(d, bv0)].
Here we give the upper bound on IP0 by reducing it to
an instance G of the following nonlocal games between
two players Adeline and Bastian, where
• Adeline receives a random element bv0 ∈ FQ. Bas-
tian receives a random element d ∈ {0, 1}.
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in FQ
such that A+B = bv0 ∗ d.
Without any loss of generality we can consider Adeline
and Bastian’s strategy to be deterministic, namely Ade-
line’s strategy is a deterministic function yv0(bv0) and
Bastian’s strategy is a deterministic function −gv0(d).
This strategy gives a lower bound on the value ω(G) of
the game:
ω(G) ≥ max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[yv0(bv0)− gv0(d) = bv0 ∗ d]
= max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[αv0(d, bv0) + d ∗ bv0)− gv0(d) = (bv0 ∗ d)]
(substituting yv0 = αv0 + bv0 ∗ d)
= max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[gv0(d) == αv0(d, bv0)]
= IP0.
We can conclude using the result of Lemma 6 proven in
the next section to the case where p = 1/2 and S =
{0, 1}: we obtain
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
. (B3)
Appendix C: A generalization of CHSHQ(p) games
with restricted inputs.
The class of CHSHQ(p) games was introduced in [22] in
order to analyze the security of the FQ protocols. These
are simply two-party nonlocal games between Adeline
and Bastian who respectively receive inputs x, y ∈ FQ
and output a, b ∈ FQ. Here x is drawn from the uniform
distribution while y is drawn according to a probability
distribution {py}y∈FQ such that maxy py ≤ p. Adeline
and Bastian win the game if a+ b = x ∗ y in FQ.
Here, we define a slight variant of these games where
the only difference is now that Adeline’s inputs are drawn
uniformly from a subset S of FQ. We denote this
class of games by CHSHSQ(p). In particular, one has
CHSHQ(p) = CHSH
FQ
Q (p).
It is straightforward to upper bound the classical value
of games in CHSHSQ(p) using the same technique as in
[22]. For completeness, we include this proof here.
Lemma 6. For any game G ∈ CHSHSQ(p), we have
ω(G) ≤ p+
√
2
|S|
. (C1)
Proof. Fix a game G ∈ CHSHSQ(p). As usual, the classi-
cal value of the game can always be achieved with a deter-
ministic strategy, meaning that without loss of generality,
Alice and Bob’s strategies can be modeled by functions
f and g, namely: a = f(x) and b = g(y). Define the vari-
able ryx equal to 1 if f(x) + g(y) = x ∗ y and 0 otherwise.
Consider the following strategy for Bob: pick a ran-
dom pair of distinct inputs y, y′ according to the dis-
tribution {py}y∈Fq , i.e. with probability pyp′y/P where
P =
∑
y 6=y′ pyp
′
y, and output the guess x̂ for x defined by
x̂ = (g(y)− g(y′)) ∗ (y− y′)−1. Let Sx be the probability
of correctly guessing the value x with this strategy. Non
signaling imposes that Ex[Sx] = 1/|S|, since the value x
is uniformly distributed in S.
On the other hand, we note that if the game G is won
for both inputs (x, y) and (x, y′), then Bob’s strategy
outputs the correct value for x. Indeed, winning the game
for both inputs means that f(x)+g(y) = x∗y and f(x)+
g(y′) = x∗y′ which implies that g(y)−g(y′) = (y−y′)∗x
and therefore x̂ = x. One immediately obtains a lower
bound on Sx:
Sx ≥
1
P
∑
y,y′ 6=y
pyr
y
xp
′
yr
y′
x ≥
∑
y,y′ 6=y
pyr
y
xp
′
yr
y′
x , (C2)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that
P ≤ 1. Consider the quantity ωx =
∑
y pyr
y
x. It satisfies:
(ωx)2 ≤
∑
y
p2y(r
y
x)
2+2Sx =
∑
y
(py)
2ryx+2Sx ≤ pωx+2Sx,
where the first inequality follows from the bound of
Eq. C2 and where we used that (ryx)2 = ryx and (py)2 ≤
13
(maxy{py}) py ≤ ppy. Solving this quadratic equation
gives that
ωx ≤ 1
2
(
p+
√
p2 + 8Sx
)
and the concavity of the square-root function implies that
ωx ≤ p+
√
2Sx.
Finally, ω(G) = Ex[ωx] by definition and using the con-
cavity of the square-root function once more shows that:
ω(G) ≤ p+
√
2Ex[
√
Sx] ≤ p+
√
2
√
Ex[Sx] ≤ p+
√
2/|S|,
which concludes the proof.
Appendix D: Generalization to n agents per party
It is straightforward to generalize the Tree protocol to
the case where each party is represented by n agents.
In that case, the binary tree should be replaced by a
complete n-ary tree, together with an n-coloring of that
tree. For the protocol to abort, it requires that n − 1
stations die simultaneously. It is straightforward to see
that the probability that the protocol succeeds becomes
(1− q(n))k with
q(n) = n(mp)n−1 + (mp)n. (D1)
Provided that nmp  1, the lifetime of the generalized
Tree protocol Tree(n) with n agents per player becomes:
tTree(n)(p,m) ≈
1
n(mp)n−1
. (D2)
It is less straightforward to generalize the security
proof to the case of n agents. However, it is natural to
conjecture that an analysis similar to that of Proposition
3 for the Tree protocol with 3 locations will work.
Conjecture 7. The k-round Tree protocol with n ≥ 3
agents per party is εk,n-binding with
εk,n = 2kxn
√
2
Q
(D3)
with
x2 = 1, xn = xn−1 +
1
4xn−1
. (D4)
In particular, asymptotically, it holds that xn ∼
√
n/2.
